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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
abstract rule of absolute immunity. The law is not static and must follow and
conform to changing conditions and new trends in human relations to justify
its existence as a servant and protector of the people.26
This extension in the Illinois rule may be the necessary first step toward
complete abandonment of the old immunity doctrine.
26 Ibid., at 564, 565 and 86, 87.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-LAYOFF AND
EXPECTATION OF STRIKE IS LOCKOUT
AND THEREFORE COMPENSATORY
Kendall Refining Co. resisted the claims of several of its employees for
Unemployment Compensation, contending that their unemployment re-
sulted from a strike. The employees were members of the Oil Workers
International Union. Sixty days before its contract was about to expire,
the union and the company began negotiations for a new agreement. Four
days before the end of the old contract term, union officials informed the
company that a vote had been taken authorizing a strike, but that no date
had been set. The next day, the company submitted a written proposal
for an orderly shutdown of the plant in the event of a strike. The union
rejected this and submitted a counterproposal which proved unsatisfactory
to the company. The day after the contract expired, employees reported
for work and were informed by the company that the plant was closed.
The question presented to the court was whether these employees were
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation because of par-
ticipation in a labor dispute or whether, under Pennsylvania law, they
were eligible for benefits because their employer had locked them out.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held they were entitled to benefits be-
cause they had been locked out. Kendall Refining Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 184 Pa. Super. 95, 132 A. 2d 749 (1957).
All states have in effect some provision disqualifying from unemploy-
ment compensation benefits claimants whose idleness results from a labor
dispute at their place of employment.' Eight states, including Pennsyl-
vania, specifically exclude a lockout from the definition of a labor dispute,
thus making employees whose idleness is so caused eligible for benefits. 2
A few states which disqualify where idleness results from a strike rather
than from a "labor dispute" permit benefits when idleness is caused by a
1 For a comprehensive discussion of the labor dispute disqualification from unem-
ployment compensation benefits refer to Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification,
A Primer and Some Problems, 8 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 338 (1955).
2 Ibid., at 365. The states are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
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lockout. 3 While the Pennsylvania statute4 poses some special problems,
courts in all of the states have the problem of determining whether em-
ployees idled when their employer shuts down his plant to conserve and
protect his property in the face of a strike threat are to be considered
as "participating in a labor dispute." The problem assumes particular
importance in such mass production industries as steel and oil where ex-
tensive damage may result unless equipment is cooled down or chemical
reactions brought to a stop before the plant is closed.
In opposing the payment of unemployment compensation to its idled
employees, Kendall took the position that as it had reason to believe that
a strike would occur, it was justified, in the absence of written assurance
of an orderly shutdown, in taking steps to protect its plant while still in
control of the labor situation. The union, arguing on behalf of the em-
ployees, contended that Kendall discontinued operations to gain an advan-
tage in collective bargaining. A strike had actually not been called; the
employees were ready and willing to work beyond the expiration date
of the contract under existing terms and conditions and had given verbal
assurance of an orderly shutdown in the event of a strike.
In this case, the court determined that the employer had no reasonable
ground for believing that a strike would occur. Neither the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement nor the calling of the strike vote so
signified a strike in this situation, the court found, because the union had
never called a strike during previous negotiations even though strike votes
had been taken. In the light of the whole history of the collective bar-
gaining relationship, the employer had reason to know that another vote
would be taken before a strike was actually called. Moreover, despite the
refusal of written assurance, the employer had reason to know that the
union would take steps to insure an orderly shutdown.
In previous cases, however, the same court has held that employees are
disqualified from receiving benefits where the employer, in anticipation
of a strike, curtails operations and employment to protect his property.
The court has said that if a union says it intends to strike and an employer,
relying on this statement, cuts down activity to permit an orderly cessa-
tion of operations and avoid damage to his property, such a shutdown
will not constitute a lockout. The responsibility for the stoppage, in that
case, would rest upon the union.5
3 Authority cited note 1 supra, at 365. The states are: Colorado and Utah.
4 Penn. Stat. Ann. (1952) c. 43, § 802 (d): An employee shall be ineligible for com-
pensation for any week: "[i]n which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work,
which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) at the factory, establish-
ment or other premises at which he is or was last employed .. "
5 Bako v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 222,90 A. 2d
309 (1952). In another case, the same court said: "When a strike is imminent, when
an employer has been officially notified that a strike will occur, and has reasonable
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The "labor dispute" disqualification applies not only to the period pre-
ceding the strike during which the employer curtailed operations and
employment in order to protect his property, but also to the period after
the announced end of a strike reasonably required to put the plant in
normal operation. This has been so held in a number of states. 6 The Illinois
Supreme Court has stated the usual rule as follows:
[The] ineligibility of a claimant for Unemployment Compensation benefits
does not automatically terminate upon the settlement of the labor dispute or
strike and conversely, where the stoppage of work continued to exist as a neces-
sary aftermath of the labor dispute . . .the claimant's ineligibility for benefits
remains.7
How long the disqualification continues depends on the circumstances
of the case. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has pointed out some of
the guiding considerations:
What is a reasonable period will always "depend upon the kind of work and
the circumstances in which it is conducted." In a department store, for instance,
resumption of employment might follow the strike's termination in the course
of a few hours. Perhaps a textile mill would require a longer time. In an industry,
such as Bethlehem Steel, operating several departments which are dependent
for power upon a central plant, with equipment to be repaired, machinery to be
cleaned, and other preparatory steps to be taken, a longer time must necessarily
be allowed. Possibly the duration of the strike becomes a relevant factor. At all
events, the Board will consider all the circumstances and override the manage-
ment only when it finds that it failed to exercise honest judgment. It follows
that, however willing employees may be to return to work immediately after
the termination of the strike, the continuing stoppage of work must be held to
be due to the original labor dispute. 8
One of the arguments which resulted in the inclusion of the "labor
dispute" disqualification in the original Social Security Board Draft Bill,
and hence in all of the state Unemployment Compensation Statutes was:
The government should remain neutral in labor disputes. The payment of
unemployment compensation would violate this neutrality not only by
providing a source of strike benefits to the employees, but by paying those
grounds for a belief that a strike will actually take place, he may, prior to and in antici-
pation thereof, take reasonably necessary measures to protect his property during the
pendency of the strike. The nature and extent of such measures depend upon the kind
of work and the circumstances in which it is conducted, and ordinarily the board will
not overrule the honest judgment of an employer." Lavely v. Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review, 166 Pa. Super. 481, 72 A. 2d 300, 302 (1950).
6 American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 88 N.E. 2d 465 (1949); Saunders
v. Maryland U. C. Board, 188 Md. 677, 53 A. 2d 579 (1947); Chrysler Corp. v. Review
Board, 120 Ind. App. 425, 92 N.E. 2d 565 (1950); Carnegie-illinois Steel Corp. v. Review
Board, 117 Ind. App. 379; 72 N.E. 2d 662 (1947).
7 American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Il. 174, 88 N.E. 2d 465 (1949).
8 Bako v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 222, 225,
90 A. 2d 309, 312 (1952).
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benefits out of the taxes which the employer has paid. 9 In addition, today,
the payment of benefits would increase the employer's taxes in most states
by assessing him a relatively unfavorable experience rating which would
automatically raise his tax.
In states which, like Pennsylvania, make the lockout exception, the
agency which determines eligibility for benefits and the courts which
review the agency's decisions cannot maintain true neutrality because
they must assess "fault" for the stoppage. If the employer is "at fault,"
the stoppage is a lockout and the employees are eligible for compensation.
If the employee or the union is "at fault," claimants are disqualified.
The majority of states have wisely chosen to avoid this issue. None of
the states, however, can avoid the problem of determining when the cur-
tailment of operations resulting from a labor dispute begins and ends.
Where operations are completely shut down before a strike, the issue may
be relatively clear. But there are situations in which, moved by both
economic considerations and the probability of disagreement at the bar-
gaining table, the employer lays off some people. Later a strike ensues.
Similarly, at the end of a strike, some companies may find their operations
curtailed because of lack of orders, or may decide for purely business
reasons to discontinue some portion of their operations. In these situations,
the courts will be hard put to distinguish between unemployment due to
a "labor dispute" and unemployment due to economic conditions.
Although the "labor dispute" disqualification applies only to those at
the factory or establishment at which the stoppage of work occurs, 10 the
unemployment compensation agencies are frequently faced with the
problem of the employee who is idled either directly or indirectly by a
dispute in some establishment other than the one in which he works.'
The Pennsylvania Superior Court was recently faced with such a prob-
lem. Claimant worked for a company that sold merchandise to department
stores and their customers. His duties had been to ship his employer's
products by parcel post. Because the department stores were on strike, he
refused to ship when the store was the consignee although he willingly
shipped direct to the store's customer. The question before the court was
whether he was ineligible for compensation by reason of discharge for
wilful misconduct connected with his work. Denying compensation, the
court pointed out: "In passing, it may be noted that as a result of his
dismissal, claimant filed a grievance with his union, and that when the
dispute went to arbitration, claimant's dismissal was upheld."
9 Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Problems,
8 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 338 (1955).
10 Authority cited note 4 supra.
11 Smolensky v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 183 Pa. Super. 344,
132 A. 2d 698 (1952).
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The court's decision follows the prevailing view in labor administrative
agencies and among those charged with determining whether an employee
has been discharged for cause under statutes and labor agreements. The
employee cannot pick and choose his tasks. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals sets forth rationale as follows:
It was implied in the contract of hiring that these employees would do the
work assigned to them in a careful and workmanlike manner; that they would
comply with all reasonable orders and conduct themselves so as not to work
injury to the employer's business; that they would serve faithfully and be re-
garded of the interests of the employer during the term of their service, and
carefully discharge their duties to the extent reasonably required .... Any em-
ployee may, of course, be lawfully discharged for disobedience of the employer's
directions, in breach of his contract .... While these employees had the un-
doubted right to go on a strike and quit their employment, they could not con-
tinue to work and remain at their positions, accept the wages paid to them, and
at the same time select what part of their allotted tasks they cared to perform of
their own volition, or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to
do other work.12
Thus, in the Smolensky case, the insubordination was clear. However,
where the employee refuses to cross a picket line to perform his duties,
another element is introduced-namely, the fear of violence. The courts
have, in these cases, therefore, sought to maintain a distinction: voluntary
refusal to cross a picket line constitutes participation in a labor dispute, 13
but refusal to cross the line because of a justifiable fear of bodily harm
will not disqualify the employee from unemployment compensation. 14
12 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486, 496 (C.A. 8th, 1946).
13 Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Md. Employment Security Board, 209 Md. 237, 121 A. 2d
198 (1956); Schooley v. Board of Review, 43 N.J. Super. 381; 128 A. 2d 708 (1957).
14 Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329; 131 N.E. 2d 64 (1956).
